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China is a resilient dinosaur. In contrast with so many other great empires in Eurasia – 
the Egyptian, Roman, Byzantine, Arabian, Ottoman and Tsarist-Soviet – China has the 
longest history. The Empire kept expanding until the mid-nineteenth century when it 
practically reached the physical limits for a predominantly agrarian economy. The size 
and wealth of the Chinese economy, the variety of its produce and the degree of 
commercialisation and urbanisation made China one of the most popular international 
trading destinations from Roman times.1 With the rise of the opium trade in the early 
nineteenth century, however, the Chinese economy has been severely impoverished at 
least in relative terms. In response, since the 1870s, the Chinese sought to rescue their 
civilisation by adopting a wide range of foreign examples in social engineering for 
social experiments and reforms.2 Nevertheless, China's per capita GDP is still very low 
despite its political influence in the world since the 1970s. It is justifiable to view China 
as a case of growth failure in the recent centuries. 
  The study of Chinese economic history has the same age as China's modern history 
itself. The field has been led and dominated by the West.3 Scholarly attempts have been 
                                                 
* I wish to thank Professors Patrick O'Brien (Institute of Historical Research), Nick Crafts (LSE), Eric L. Jones 
(Universities of Melbourne and Reading), Ramon H. Myers (Stanford University), Alan MacFarlane (Cambridge), 
Drs. Gareth Austin (LSE), Janet Hunter (LSE), and Mr. Gerry Martin (Renaissance Trust) for their invaluable 
advices and extensive comments on this work. 
  1  To demonstrate China's disposable wealth in 1884, Japan invaded Korea and three provinces of North China 
and forced China to pay 200 million ounces of silver (7,460.3 tons) as war reparation. The amount has been 
estimated as a quarter of the Japanese total national income. This sum was used by the Japanese to balance their 
trade deficit as well as establish a gold standard. Contemporary Japanese scholars counted China’s reparation as 
windfall of ‘foreign capital’. See Minami, The Economic Development of Japan, pp. 12, 201. 
  2 The Meiji Restoration was mirrored in China's 1870-95 'Westernisation Movement' and the 1898 'One-
Hundred-Day Reform'. The 1789 French Revolution was copied in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Revolution to end the 
monarchy. A Chinese version of the Bolshevik Revolution was witnessed in the Communist attempts under various 
leaders to reunite the country and cleanse society. The Stalinist ISI and command economy was transplanted in c. 
1956–58 in order to industrialise without the pains of capitalism. The Yugoslavian-Bulgarian institutional reform 
was imported in 1978 to soften the economic crisis under communism. The Asian Tigers' EOI was followed since 
the mid-80s and reached its climax with China’s bid for its WTO membership. The Malthusian birth control was 
carried out in the early 70s.  
  3 This is not only because of the systematic, effective destruction of the Chinese academia under Maoism in the 
50s throughout the 70s but also in terms of the analytical tools and methods in use, including Marxism, as well as the 
sheer volume of scholarly works. No doubt, Chinese studies has become a large enterprises in Japan. For example, 
there have been some 600 works on water control in China alone (see Elvin et al., Japanese Studies on the History of 2 
made since the turn of this century to explain China's premodern success and its 
downfall after the Opium War. Two approaches can be identified: the 'Sinological 
approach' which refers to China only and the 'comparative method' which compares 
China with the West. The former tries to find out what achievements China managed to 
make and when and how it made them and the latter seeks to understand why 
premodern China was not industrialised. 
 
I 
  The findings of the 'Sinological approach' can be highlighted under five headings.4 
First, China seems to have enjoyed superiority in premodern Eurasia in science and 
technology,5 agricultural productivities (labour, land and total factor),6 and military 
power.7 Various studies have indicated that the Chinese probably reached a premodern 
ceiling for development in all these areas.8 For example, in terms of the number of 
inventions, the Chinese almost certainly held the world record on the eve of the 
European Renaissance with a long list including metallurgy, gunpowder, the compass, 
silk, porcelain, paper-making and paper currency, block printing, mechanical clocks, 
and examinations to recruit civil servants, to name but a few.  
  Second, by premodern standards China achieved a high degree of 
commercialisation and urbanisation. Favourable conditions for commerce, including the 
use of paper currency and the establishment of credit institutions, existed in China 
much earlier than in Europe: for example, capitalist elements were evident in China 
long before Christ.9 Moreover, the construction and maintenance of nation-wide roads, 
the waterway arteries (known as the Grand Canals), the investment in large-scale water-
control schemes, the circulation of minted currencies, the manipulation of grain prices, 
and the use of standardised weights and measures lowered transaction costs throughout 
the economy.10 Furthermore, a remarkable degree of social mobility as well as internal 
migration provided citizens with some incentives to study and accumulate wealth.11 The 
                                                                                                                                               
Water Control in China, A Selected Bibliography). However, since few such works have been translated into other 
languages, their influence has remained minimum beyond the Japanese border.  
  4 Mokyr catalogued the Chinese technological superiority into as many as ten categories in his The Lever of 
Riches, pp. 209-18. 
5 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China; Temple, The Genius of China; Merson, Roads to Xanadu. 
6 Ho, 'Aspects of Social Mobility'; Perkins, Agricultural Development; Rawski, Agricultural Change: chs 3, 6; 
Elvin, The Pattern; Hsu, Han Agriculture; Bray, 'Agriculture'; Huang, The Peasant Economy; Smith, 'Commerce, 
Agriculture and Core Formation'; Deng, Development versus Stagnation. 
7 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, ch. 2; Levathes,When China Ruled the Seas. 
  8 Typically see Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past. 
9 The Pattern, chs 11-12; Jones, Growth Recurring, p. 74. 
10The Pattern. 
11 Ho, 'Aspects of Social Mobility'; Ho, The Ladder of Success; Eberhard, Social Mobility; Hartwell, 'Patterns 
of Settlement'; Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities, chs 4-5. 3 
non-agricultural population, which accounted for some 20 per cent of China's total, 
formed the cornerstone of the domestic market for cash crops, especially foodstuffs, 
textiles and tea. Apart from professional merchants and despite the fact that commerce 
was more concentrated in some favoured regions of the Empire,12 the main feature of 
China's commercialisation was 'entrepreneurilisation of the peasantry': an ordinary 
peasant participated regularly and actively in the market by trading a considerable 
percentage of his output.13 According to Perkins and Feuerwerker, from the Ming 
(1368–1644) to the early twentieth century as much as 20–40 per cent of China's 
agricultural output was marketed, or one-sixth to one-third of China's total GDP.14 Even 
in relatively poor North China, 25–40 per cent of rural households earned their income 
from non-farming activities.15 In terms of the scale and scope of the market, in 
Skinner's account, China's multi-regional, multi-layered trading network consisted of as 
many as 45,000 market towns, each of which affected on average 15–20 villages.16  
  Based on a stable surplus of food produced by the agricultural sector and the 
seasonality of farming, China had fully-fledged, rurally-based proto-industrialisation 
which paralleled that of Europe until the nineteenth century.17 By Song times, the total 
annual iron output, for example, was estimated as 150,000 tons.18 Under the Song, large 
quantities of heavy iron coins were minted for circulation. The fact that they were so 
heavy means that these coins were used as ingots not currency tokens. Thus iron must 
have been regarded as monetary metal with great value. In light of this, this output says 
more about the economy. During the heyday of the porcelain trade in the seventeenth 
century, exports of Chinese ceramics alone could easily have reached a level of one 
million pieces a year.19 As late as 1800, China accounted for roughly a third of the total 
world manufacturing output and was still ahead of the West. By about 1830 the shares 
were comparable.20 Household spinning and weaving in rural regions were already 
important before the Ming Period (1368–1644). Afterwards, the trend moved towards 
full-time by-employment.21 In parts of China, 'tilling by the male and weaving by the 
female' implied that as the norm at least one adult in a rural household was engaged in 
                                                 
12 Rawski, Agricultural Change. 
13 Latourette, The Chinese, p. 575; Skinner, 'Chinese Peasants', pp. 272-3; Gates, China's Motor. 
14 Perkins, Agricultural Development, p. 115; Feuerwerker, State and Society, p. 86. 
15 See Skinner, 'Marketing and Social Structure', 'Chinese Peasants', and The City; Myers, The Chinese Peasant 
Economy, pp. 12-13. 
16 Skinner, 'Chinese Peasants', pp. 272-3; see also Skinner, 'Marketing and Social Structure'. 
17 Chao, Man and Land, pp. 24-5; Wong, China Transformed, chs 2-3. 
  18 Harrison, The Chinese Empire, p. 290; cf. Elvin The Pattern, p. 85, Hartwell, Iron and Early Industrialism, 
'Markets, Technology, and the Structure of Enterprise', and 'A Cycle of Economic Change'.  
  19 Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions and Sea Power of Premodern China, Ch. 1, Section 1. 
20 Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations, p. 86; also Kennedy, Great Powers, p. 149. 
21 Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11, pp. 17-18, 21. 4 
non-farming production all the year round. Household industry retained a competitive 
edge over factory production until the first quarter of the twentieth century.22 This 
division of labour and the pervasive by-employments supported the trade network that 
was manned by professional merchants to move goods over long distances across the 
Empire, a phenomenon which has been described as 'petty production at the household 
level and great circulation of commodities in the economy'.23  
  The undertakings of the non-food cash crops were on such a scale that during the 
period between 1750 and 1875, South China was the main supplier of tea, together with 
silk, to the rest of the world.24 The Empire traded with the outside world not just as a 
diplomatic gesture but out of necessity. For example, China depended on imported war 
horses for the army and imported materials for medicine and monetary metals. 
Although foreign trade was often subject to state monopoly, bans on private trading 
represented only short episodes in China's long-term history.25 In terms of exports, 
China supplied industrial goods such as lacquerware, ceramics, textiles, metal products 
(made of iron, lead, copper/bronze, silver and gold), non-metal handicrafts, stationery 
and books to Asia and, sometimes, beyond.26 Not until the early nineteenth century had 
China been downgraded to the status of a primary exporter.27 Still, in late Qing, the 
ratio of domestic to international trade was 2.3–3.1:1 in volume which reflects the 
importance of foreign trade in the economy.28 To depict the Chinese government as 
protecting farming and tolerating trade and to represent the traditional Chinese 
economy as an 'agrarian commercial economy' are both well justified.29
  Third, China protected and nurtured producers' incentives with reasonably well-
defined property rights.30 Thus, Tawney described the typical figure in Chinese country 
life not as the hired labour, but the landholding peasant. Similarly, Rawski maintains 
that 'for at least the last millennium, Chinese agriculture has been dominated by a large 
number of free, small-scale farmers, working under a system of private land-
                                                 
22 Li, 'Husband and Wife Tilling Together'; see also Huang, The Peasant Family, pp. 44-57; Huang, The 
Peasant Economy; Chao, The Development of Cotton Textile Production, pp. 174-80. 
23 Zhang, 'Petty Production'. 
24 During the Qing Period when tea and silk formed at least 90 per cent of the total value of the Chinese 
exports to Britain. For more information see Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities, ch. 5. 
25 Morse, The Chronicles; Hall, 'Notes on the Early Ch'ing'; Boxer, South China; Wang, 'The Nanhai Trade'; 
Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-Kuo; Rossabi, 'The Tea and Horse Trade'; Le Corbeiller, China Trade Porcelain; Jörg, 
Porcelain; Chang, Chinese Maritime Trade; Ng, Trade and Society; May and Fairbank, America's China Trade; 
Tampoe, Maritime Trade; Cushman, Fields from the Sea; Fan, Long Distance Trade; Manguin, 'Trading Ships'; 
Gardella, Harvesting Mountains; Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities, chs 4-5; Deng, 'The Foreign Staple Trade'; also 
see Greenberg, British Trade; Iwao, 'Japanese Foreign Trade'; Furber, Rival Empires; Chaudhuri, The Trading 
World; Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation. 
26 Deng, 'The Foreign Staple Trade'. 
27 Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities, ch. 5. 
28 Rawski, Economic Growth, p. 193. 
29 Wong, China Transformed, p. 138. 
30 Deng, The Premodern Chinese Economy, chs 2-3. 5 
ownership'.31 This pattern of landholding remained dominant until the inter-war 
period.32 Internally, the widespread system of 'village-based responsibility for criminal 
offences' and 'neighbourhood watch' systems safeguarded law and order upon which the 
property rights and their enforcement heavily depended.33 To guard its resources and 
investments, China had built by the third century BC an effective defence line marked 
by the Great Walls against looting and killing by nomads and was the only 'walled 
empire' in world history.  
  Even with peace, internal law and order, to maintain such a landholding peasantry 
over the long run was a major institutional achievement, given that landed property is 
an ideal commodity for business speculation and that China had an active market in 
land. In addition, the Chinese practised partible inheritance which split family property 
by the generation. Most of time, China managed to keep a balance, avoiding the 
concentration of property ownership, as the Imperial state maintained reliable 
communications for gathering information about disasters and fluctuations in food 
prices; held disposable resources like cash loans and food storage initiatives to provide 
the peasantry with relief so that individual households rarely lost all their property. The 
land-saving technology and high yields of Chinese agriculture softened the shortage of 
land.  
  The ideology of physiocracy ('agricultural fundamentalism') shared among the 
Confucian meritocrats also helped check excessive rent-seeking by the state, although 
local hiccups of corruption and occasional derailment of the state apparatus occurred 
from time to time.34 This physiocratic policy pushed the expansion of the empire in all 
directions including off-shore Taiwan. Such territorial expansion was the ultimate 
solution for land shortages. Until Tsarist Russia conquered during the second half of the 
nineteenth century parts of Siberia and Turkestan that had been controlled by the 
Qing,35 the Empire possessed a territory well over 10 million square kilometres 
compared with 1.6 million square kilometres under the Shang (c. 1520–1030).36  
  Fourth, some long-term patterns of China's premodern growth have been 
established. This was pioneered by Elvin in his The Pattern of the Chinese Past (1973). 
The effort continued by Skinner in his 'The Structure of Chinese History' (1985). Both 
studies recognise regional shifts in the centre of economic gravity and changes in 
technology, productivity, demography, institutions and economic structures. Both 
                                                 
31 Tawney, Life and Labour, p. 34; Rawski, Agricultural Change, p. 3; cf. Elvin, Pattern, ch. 15. 
32 Fei, Peasant Life; Buck, Land Utilization. 
33 Waverick, China: A Model. 
34 Deng, Development versus Stagnation, ch. 2. 
35 CBW, Encyclopaedia (1989), p. 1596. 
36 Song, Regional Cultures, p. 201. 6 
studies identify the Song Period (960–1279) as the premodern peak, after which no 
significant progress took place. Elvin refers to this situation as a 'high-level equilibrium 
trap'; and Skinner, 'regional cycles'.37
  Last but not least, although scholars have generally agreed that China's population 
experienced a rapid rise after the seventeenth century,38 some studies have suggested 
that average standards of living in the advanced southeast region (roughly Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Hunan and Guangdong) matched standards in Western Europe during the 
eighteenth century,39 an observation which is well supported by a fortiori evidence 
from travelogues of European visitors.40 And, China's education and popular literacy 
level remained also high.41
 
II 
The credibility of those findings is subject to debate. Although the information of 
China's socio-economic conditions over three millennia is extensive, it is incomplete. 
Guesstimation is inevitable and contradictory conclusions are not uncommon.42 In 
terms of methodology, there have been two main problems for the Sinological 
approach. First, what was the relationship between regions and the empire as a whole? 
Second, where did ecological and political forces enter long-term economic history? 
  To deal with an empire like China with multiple regions with different climatic, 
hydraulic, topographical and soil conditions, sub-cultural groups and behavioural 
patterns, studies of short and medium-term developments of regions not only make 
sense but are also easily manageable. Since the late 1950s, there has been a clear trend 
towards studies into local and time constrained economic history although the 
groundwork was laid much earlier in the 1930s in Chi's work Key Economic Areas in 
Chinese History (1936). Numerous works followed his example including Wang's 'The 
Nanhai Trade' (1958), Hartwell's Iron and Early Industrialism in Eleventh-Century 
China (1963) and 'A Cycle of Economic Change in Imperial China: Coal and Iron in 
                                                 
37 Elvin, The Pattern, p. 313; Skinner, 'The Structure of Chinese History', p. 270. 
38 Numerous works, for example Ho, Population of China; Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 
192–216; Fei and Liu ‘Population Dynamics of Agrarianism in Traditional China’; and Lee 'Food Supply and 
Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850'. A good summery is offered by Maddison in his Chinese 
Economic Performance in the Long Run, 'Appendix D'. 
39 Pomeranz, 'Rethinking Eighteenth-Century China'; Pomeranz, Economy, Ecology, Comparisons and 
Connections; Wong, China Transformed, pp. 27-8; see also Bairoch, Economics and World History, p. 95; for more 
conservative estimate see O'Brien, 'Intercontinental Trade', pp. 85-6. 
40 See for example Barrow, Travels in China, p. 527; Ellis, Late Embassy to China,vol. 2, pp. 128-9; Bairoch, 
Economics and World History, pp. 106-8. 
41 Rawski, Education and Popular Literacy; Deng, Development versus Stagnation, chs 2, 7. 
42 Fairbank, Chinese Thought and Institutions, The United States and China, The Cambridge History of China; 
Wittfogel,  Oriental Despotism; Balazs, Chinese Civilization; Qian, The Great Inertia; Skinner, 'Marketing and 
Social Structure'; Elvin, The Pattern; Tang, 'China's Agricultural Legacy'; Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities, ch. 4. 
See also Chao, Man and Land, ch. 1; Mokyr, The Lever of Riches, ch. 9. 7 
Northwest China, 750–1350' (1967), Twitchett's 'Merchant, Trade and Government in 
Late T'ang' (1968), Ho's 'The Loess and the Origin of Chinese Agriculture' (1969), 
Myers's  The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and 
Shangtung, 1890–1949 (1970), Shiba's Commerce and Society in Sung China (1970), 
Rawski's Agricultural Change and Peasant Economy of South China (1972), Wang's 
Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911 (1973), Skinner's The City in Late 
Imperial China (1977), Hsu's Han Agriculture (1980), Huang's The Peasant Economy 
and Social Change in North China (1985) and The Peasant Family and Rural 
Development in the Yangzi Delta,  1350–1988 (1990), Marks's 'Rice Prices, Food 
Supply, and Market Structure in Eighteenth-Century South China' (1991), Rawski and 
Li's Chinese History in Economic Perspective (1992), just to name a few. 
  Regional studies over the short/medium-run have contributed greatly to the 
understanding of the mechanisms of Chinese development. Yet, they often overlook a 
basic structural factor namely that most of the time and in main part of China had a 
nation-wide market, a single government (which was active in maintaining food supply, 
famine relief and price control), a standardised written language, a uniform system of 
calendar, weights and measures, a dominant Confucian code of conduct, a network of 
nation-wide transportation and the mechanisms for social mobility and inter-regional 
migration. Together, they were able to iron out, to some considerable degree, regional 
differences. Thus, these differences may be less significant than some scholars suppose. 
  In contrast to a strong growth in regional studies, long-term and empire-wide 
studies are becoming an 'endangered species', although these two approaches are largely 
complementary and Chinese economic history needs both. One reason is the 
information and knowledge constraint that any individual faces. For example, The 
Official Histories of the Twenty-Five Dynasties contains over 33 million words in 
classical Chinese.43 It takes at least ten years' linguistic and historical training for a 
student to be able to understand the material. In addition, long-term and empire-wide 
studies of the 'broad brush' fashion are notoriously inclined to overgeneralisation, which 
easily attracts criticism. All these make long-term and empire-wide studies a risky 
business. Nevertheless, some heuristic attempts have been made in Lee's The Economic 
History of China (1969), Elvin's The Pattern of the Chinese Past (1973), Bray's volume 
on agriculture in Science and Civilisation in China (1984), Chao's Man and Land in 
Chinese History (1986), and more recently, Wong's China Transformed (1997).  
  Turning to the second problem, we know that the main difference between 
economics and economic history is that economics makes certain parti pris assumptions 
about the environment and the political framework for economic activity. But 
                                                 
43 S and S, The Official Histories. 8 
throughout history China was not only invaded many times by nomadic peoples from 
outside its borders but was also turned upside down many more times by its own 
citizens, mainly the peasants: in all there were 1,109 main military conflicts between 
the Chinese and the northern nomads from 215 BC to  AD 168444 and as many as 
225,887 recorded armed rebellions between 210 BC and AD 1900.45 The impacts of 
these conflicts and rebellions were not trivial in terms of both accounting costs and 
opportunity costs as huge numbers of people and animals were killed, vast areas of 
cultivated land abandoned, and farming equipment and facilities destroyed. Severe 
natural disasters such as the periodic flooding of the Yellow River had similar effects. 
To ignore disasters in dealing with China's economic past can thus be very misleading. 
Although periodic outbreaks of political turmoil are now recognised by all sinologists,46 
it was not until the early 1980s that the disaster as a major factor in long-term economic 
history was systematically explored by Jones who sees the Mongol invasion of Song 
China during the thirteenth century as the turning point for an economic downfall for 
the Chinese.47 For a more recent period, Rawski gave heavy weight to the economy-
wide damages caused by the invading Japanese in the period of 1937–1945.48  
 
III 
Compared to the the Sinological approach, the 'comparative approach' is more 
complicated and controversial. The main debate in the field of premodern Chinese 
economic history focusses on the key question of why China failed to advance further 
from its outstanding achievements under the Song. The implicit benchmark for such 
comparison is Western European economic growth since the Renaissance, especially 
the British Industrial Revolution. Jones's well-known phrase that China reached within 
a hair's breadth of industrialising in the fourteenth century sums up the problem.49 
Needham also asked the same question when he enquired into why the Chinese never 
passed the threshold required to develop controlled scientific experimentation of the 
post-Renaissance type.  
  With very different clusters of endowments, very different price structures for 
factors of production and equally different institutions, China and Western Europe were 
almost different 'Darwinian species' and comparison is problematic, because in the end 
                                                 
44 Fu Z. et al., A Military History. 
45 Li et al., Peasant Rebellions; Fan, Chinese History; Liu et al., Pre-modern China; CBW, Encyclopaedia 
(1979), pp. 4766-816; Zhang and Zheng, Struggle of the Chinese Peasantry. 
46 See for example Fairbank's 'dynastic cycle' in his The United States and China, ch. 5. 
  47 Jones's keeps nothing as a constant. See his The European Miracle and 'The Real Question about China: 
Why Was the Song Economic Achievement Not Repeated?' 
48 Rawski, Economic Growth. 
49 Jones, The European Miracle, p. 160. 9 
the question inevitably becomes why China was not another Western Europe.50 
Philosophically, although the growth in Western Europe was real and thus 'Darwinian 
positive', the use of the European experience as a gauge to measure China can be 
'Hegelian normative' due to its built-in 'counterfactualism'. This acultural and non-
endowmental approach is deeply rooted in European beliefs, such as Marxism, in a 
unilinear and unipotent developmental path.51 It is worth noting that the fantasy of 
unilinear development violates Marx's own 'historical materialism' which is Darwinian 
in nature.52  
  A recent work by Wong viewing China as a distinct system of economic 
functions/mechanisms marks an important step toward the Darwinian end,53 although 
one also needs to be careful not to glorify 'Darwinian longevity' simply because 
survival is not even a necessary criterion of growth and development. In the long run, 
as Keynes has told us, we are all dead. 
  Alternatively, one could compare different economic performances during different 
historical periods to see trends within the same civilisation – an approach pioneered by 
Jones who asks why the Chinese did not repeat their Song achievements.54 Although he 
departs from a simplistic acultural and non-endowmental comparison, the approach 
posits socio-economic hegemony under the Song and socio-economic inferiority after. 
Hegelism will always be with us. 
  Yet, no matter how conscious economic historians are of the differences between 
China and the West, the convertibility of Chinese economic performance to indices of 
Western European performance has made comparisons attractive (with a long list 
including per capita outputs and incomes, man-to-land ratios, crop yields, population 
densities, degrees of commercialisation/urbanisation, and standards of living measured 
by calorie intakes).55  
  The development of acultural and non-endowmental comparison approaches 
probably also has something to do with the constraints of knowledge about the world. 
Thus, some visible/tangible, universal yardsticks are needed to measure the 
technological and economic status. It is easy to measure superiority by rank in a 
                                                 
50 Wong, China Transformed, pt. 1. 
51 Hegel, Philosophy of World History; Marx, 'Manifesto of the Communist Party'; Rostow, The Stages of 
Economic Growth. 
52 See Darwin, On the Origin of the Species.  
  53 Marx claims that ultimately the 'force of production' determines 'relations of production' and thus determines 
the developmental path. His 'force of production' is clearly 'shaped' by the relationship between nature and man. If 
societies live in dissimilar physical environments with different endowments, price structures and institutions, how 
can they be destined in the same end and in the same way? In other words, how can fatalistic Hegelism (which ranks 
superiority with developmental paths) and naturalistic Darwinism (which rejects a unilinear path and allowed for 
mutation and extinction and defines superiority as survival) ever be combined? 
  54 Jones,  'The Real Question'. 
  55 A recent attempt was Maddison's Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. 10 
technical, economic and military pecking order. Thus, to some extent, the raison d'étre 
for the use of Western Europe as a benchmark is justifiable. This European benchmark 
will, pace Darwin, remain as a second best solution regardless of opposition from both 
the camp of the 'reference' (Western Europe) and the 'comparee' (China).  
 
IV 
Once post-Renaissance Europe is used as the benchmark for comparison, China's past 
presents a huge paradox. Given all the aforementioned achievements, China seems to 
have possessed nearly all the important ingredients for further development and at times 
even displayed major characteristics for an incipient industrial revolution.56 China 
seems to have been a genuine candidate for the first industrialised society but never got 
there. The Hegelian development broke down.57 So much so that China has been 
labelled 'exceptional' and 'counterfactual'.58  
  However, from a Darwinian perspective, a linear development is not only optional 
and probably random but also relative.59 China is indeed factual and anti-theoretical 
instead. Whether the economy was ever truly a candidate for the first industrialised 
society becomes irrelevant.60 China seems much less puzzling. Sinologists tend to 
favour this Darwinian vision, viewing China as a world of its own. This is often 
labelled China's uniqueness. Nevertheless, to explain China's failure to develop along 
European lines has been mainstream historical practice. There are numerous 
comparative works which have contributed to our understanding of premodern Chinese 
economic performance.  
  Nine schools can be singled out in this survey: ideological determinism, market 
model, environmental determinism, class-struggle hypothesis, population models, 
technological determinism, rent-seeking government and exploitative landlordism 
hypothesis and role of the state. 
  Ideological determinism owed much to Hegel who believed that socio-economic 
development is determined by spirit. Such spirit can be interpreted as religions, 
ideologies and ideas. Since religions, ideologies and ideas are not difficult to identify 
and they are often more or less unique to different civilisations or 'cultures', everything 
                                                 
56 Elvin, The Pattern. 
  57 See, for example, Lin, 'The Needham Puzzle'. 
58 See Elvin, 'China as a Counterfactual'. 
  59 I reject the application of Darwinism the way 'social Darwinism' presents, especially in terms of competition 
for resources with non-peaceful means and pursuit of political, military and economic hegemony. Rather, I limit my 
application of Darwin's idear to a process of evolution with a set of specific economic conditions. Thus, I would 
rather call my approach 'socio-economic evolution' instead of 'social Darwinism'. 
60 See for example Wong, China Transformed, pp. 101, 111. 11 
can be attributed to them.61 For ideological determinists, a conclusive answer to China's 
puzzle can thus be given. For example, Weber represented the Chinese mindset as the 
main reason for China's lack of indigenous capitalist growth.62 Fairbank in his Chinese 
Thought and Institutions (1957) and Qian in his The Great Inertia (1985) further 
pointed to 'deficiencies' in Chinese ideology and cultural values, deficiencies that froze 
Chinese creativity, misled talent, wasted energy and led the economy into 
backwardness. Needham, the doyen in the study of Chinese premodern science and 
technology, is among those who agree with such views.63
  Although such studies promote cultural understanding, the approach has the flavour 
of fatalism and associates development with pre-programmed choices that have been 
made for later generations long before they are born. More seriously, it is known that in 
history peoples who shared similar cultures or beliefs had very different economic 
developmental paths. In Asia, one can ask why the Confucianised (or partly 
Confucianised) Japanese succeeded in adapting Western industrialisation while the 
Chinese who had patented Confucianism did not; nor until after WWII did the other 
Confucian peoples (such as the Koreans and Vietnamese). Similarly, the adoption from 
Europe of a 'modern' ideology (Marxism-Leninism) after 1949 did not help much in 
mainland China's economic growth, whereas during the same period the Confucian 
values supported rapid growth in 'Asian Tigers'. There can be little doubt that ideology 
and cultural values do not provide sufficient conditions for the explanation of growth or 
retardation. 
  The entrepreneurial spirit is often attached to this school of thought, and China's 
problem is often attributed to a lack of entrepreneurship.64 But this suggestion is 
incompatible with the volume and range of Chinese inventions and innovations in 
premodern times or with the scale, scope and profitability of Chinese commercial 
activities.65
  Market model. A great many scholars regard the market as a locomotive for 
economic growth. Hicks elaborated this idea.66 According to Hicks, Europe enjoyed 
favourable conditions for the diffusion of markets, including the rise of an agricultural 
surplus, specialisation, professional traders, the establishment and maintenance of law 
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and order, money and credit, as well as mercantile policies.67 Alas, Hicks ignored the 
fact that Europe was not so unique. These conditions also existed in China. As early as 
the sixth century BC private ownership and basic property rights emerged in China. 
China had a highly productive agricultural sector which yielded surplus. China was also 
considered by Europeans to be one of the most orderly and lawful societies on earth.68 
In terms of the market economy, China had a sophisticated monetary system and 
extensive domestic and international trading networks.69 As Feuerwerker observed, 
'from the Song onward, China's economy was essentially a market economy in which 
most of the economic results were determined by decisions made and actions taken in 
the private sector'.70 A recent work by Kelly shows that Song China had an 
'economywide market' without parallel elsewhere in the world until the eighteenth 
century.71  
  Perhaps Hicks's model is too romantic about the function of the market. Why these 
favourable conditions did not lead China anywhere near the achievements of Western 
European becomes far less puzzling if we go back to the basics of classical and neo-
classical economics. Although a functioning market can optimise the allocation of 
resources, it does not automatically lead to sustained technological and economic 
development. Instead, the market may lead to a general equilibrium and thus a 
Ricardian 'stationary state'. Indeed, China looks merely like an economy with a high 
degree of commercialisation in a stationary state. So, the market model itself has a 
problem: it expects too much from the market. 
  Environmental determinism. Deep in Hicks's market model is the core of 
environmental determinism. This revealed unmistakably when he praised Europe's 
geographic advantages over Asia and consequently attributed growth to the mercy of 
nature.72 Such a view is still influential.73 But what is often overlooked is that there is 
an 'Asian Mediterranean' in the China seas.74 In the past, different peoples met, 
migrated and traded there. Monsoon winds greatly helped shipping in the Asian 
Mediterranean and there is no reason to view Asia as geographically inferior to the 
Mediterranean on the other side of Eurasia.75 Therefore, geographic difference no 
longer provides a safe haven for environmental determinism in studying China. Elvin's 
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study of long-term environmental changes in China indicates that it was human 
economic activities that determined environment rather than the other way around.76
  Class-struggle hypothesis. There are two inter-related aspects to this Marxist 
hypothesis. Firstly, a society constitutes rival classes with contrasting economic 
interests: slaves versus their masters, serfs versus feudal lords, and wage workers versus 
capitalists etc. Secondly, political and economic struggles among rival classes were the 
driving forces of socio-economic change.77 But it is extremely doubtful whether a 
population can and should be divided into different interest groups in the way 
portrayed. It is even more questionable to view the tension among classes as the norm 
since half Eurasia was under Marx's own classless 'Asiatic Mode of Production' (AMP). 
Moreover, from Marx's own AMP paradigm, a classless society may well be the end of 
growth. Marx's communism turned out to be a Pandora's Box. 
  Fundamentally, slavery, feudalism and capitalism are not universal. They were 
largely absent in China where landholding peasants were much less divided by 'class' 
than in other parts of Eurasia.78 At best, China had a 'gentry' stratum, partly rural and 
partly urban with possession of land and good Confucian education and an easy access 
to state power at the highest level.79 Ordinary members of the gentry were involved in 
grass-roots administration. 
  Numerous works were done during the 1950s–60s, eg. Fei's China's Gentry (1953), 
Chang's The Chinese Gentry (1955), Marsh's The Mandarins (1961), Ho's The Ladder 
of Success in Imperial China (1962), and Eberhard's Social Mobility in Traditional 
China (1962). They revealed distinct differences between the Chinese gentry and the 
feudal landholding class in medieval Western Europe and Tokugawa Japan. The 
Chinese gentry’s status was in principle non-inheritable and non-rigid. The average 
landholding of the members of the Chinese gentry was in real terms far smaller than 
that of the feudal upper class of medieval Western Europe and Tokugawa Japan.80  
  Even if the Chinese gentry is treated as a feudal class, the fact that the feudal 
landholding class in medieval Western Europe and Tokugawa Japan facilitated 
capitalism and the Chinese gentry did not presents a paradox. Treating the Chinese 
gentry as a feudal class, as many Marxist historians have done, is utterly misleading, 
representing a major step backward from Marx's AMP which at least admits classless 
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features in Asia. It is worth noting that historians in mainland China have deeply 
divided into two camps in accordance with Marx's own contradicting views on the 
Eurasian world: the 'party scholars' are die-hard class-strugglers who stick to the 
'Hegelian Marx' while the 'liberal scholars' are attracted by the 'Darwinian Marx' with 
the AMP as an alternative view on China's past.81 As the liberal Darwinian Marx was 
proved politically incorrect in Mao's era, the debate on 'sprout of capitalism' based on 
the Hegelian Marx has gone to a fruitless dead-end.82
  Population models. Those regard population growth as having a negative impact on 
socio-economic development are Malthusians whose model has been one of the most 
frequently used theories in explaining China's past.83 Chao's recent monograph portrays 
over-population as the main source of Chinese economic backwardness.84 But his work 
is based on four questionable assumptions. First, there existed no economic divergence 
in peasant households who produced almost the same things generation after 
generation. Second, there were few technological and/or structural changes, especially 
in the later period of the Empire. Third, the supply of land was inelastic. Fourth, there 
was no preventive check on population growth. Thus the decline in man-to-land ratio 
was taken as the sole indicator for economic deterioration in China. 
  Recent research suggests a different picture. China's rural economy was very 
divergent during the Ming–Qing Period when vigorous population increase occurred. In 
places like the Yangzi Delta surplus rural labour was absorbed almost completely by 
handicraft industries so that the actual land–labour ratio in farming changed little.85 
During the same period technological changes continued to stave off diminishing 
returns. For example, the vast interior region of the Yangzi–Han Plain, some 400,000 
square kilometres, was redeveloped and transformed to a highly productive, remarkably 
commercialised and urbanised regional economy, known for its regular net export of 
large quantities of rice, raw silk/cotton and cloth. This development was underpinned 
by a new method of land utilisation and reclamation (known as 'diked paddies'), new 
crops and new market opportunities. The total annual grain output of the region was at 
least doubled between the Chenghua Reign (1465–87) and the Yongzheng Reign 
(1723–35) to 2.21 million metric tons. Of this output, 62 per cent was marketed.86  
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  During the same period, in Shandong of the northeast, a province with one of the 
poorest man-to-land ratios in China,87 similar changes took place. The acreage under 
cultivation was doubled, and a multi-cropping system was adopted with a range of 
newly-introduced plant species. Consequently, despite a doubling population, 
Shandong maintained its position as a net exporter of salt, wheat, dry fruits, soy beans 
and groundnut products, raw cotton/silk and cloth, raw and processed tobacco, pottery 
and mats with an estimated aggregate value of 2,050–2,240 metric tons of silver a 
year.88  
  Evidence also shows that in some of the richest farming areas of Jiangsu Province, 
population control was practised, resulting in a growth rate of a mere 0.3 per cent a 
year.89 Recent research has also indicated that the observed increase in food prices 
(often quoted as evidence for the alleged deterioration of the man-to-land ratio in Qing 
times) was in effect a symptom of a 'price revolution' caused by the importation of large 
quantities of silver over time, together with the impact of China's integration into the 
capitalist world economy.90 After all, there was no empire-wide famine in Ming–Qing 
China. 
  Since two production factors – technology and land input – were both elastic, it is 
unlikely that any crisis of diminishing returns occurred in the advanced farming regions 
where rural 'over-employment' rather than 'under-employment' was the norm.91 
Therefore, the Malthusian man-to-land ratio approach loses its appeal in explaining 
China's economic performance in the late Imperial period. Because, overlooking other 
vital variables, a man-to-land ratio remains almost meaningless like the face value of 
any unconverted currency in a foreign market. 
  In contrast to Malthus, Boserup argues that there is a built-in mechanism in human 
society to have sustainable technological growth vis-à-vis an increase in human 
biomass and that in history the population pressure could be a generator of 
technological change rather than a retardant for it.92 Similarly, neo-institutionalism 
views population pressure as the driving force throughout history of institutional 
changes which in turn generated growth.93 Elvin is among a few 'Boserupians' who 
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indicate that continuous technological change in late traditional China was a key factor 
in allowing the Empire to cope with population pressure until the seventeenth century.94 
Nevertheless, the Boserupian model cannot explain why densely populated East Asia 
lost its superiority to less populated Western Europe. Boserup treated China as an 
exception by arguing that the Chinese population went too far away from the so-called 
'Boserup Space', an optimal range for population growth and technological 
advancement.95 She then slid into the Malthusian camp. 
  Technological determinism. Elvin's core thesis is that China's problem was chiefly 
technological in that China's rapid population growth finally ate up the benefit of 
earlier, high level technological achievements,96 and thus handicapped China's 
growth.97 He described this as 'quantitative growth, qualitative standstill', or extensive 
growth with no improvement in per capita income. Elvin's more recent works suggest a 
technology-cum-investment lock-in which led to low-growth path dependency.98 
Similarly, Kelly attempted to portray the Song Period as a case of one-off growth of a 
Smithian type without technological breakthroughs.99  
  Technological determinism describes the Ming–Qing Period fairly well because 
unprecedented population growth did occur. Alas, it does not explain how and why 
China managed to reach such a high technological level in the first place. It it hard to 
prove a case that early generations were able to delay the impact of diminishing returns 
by inventing new technology by 'guessing right' ahead of time while the later 
generations somewhat lost such ability. It is particularly doubtful whether technological 
growth really slowed down during Ming–Qing times. If historians take account of the 
'green revolution' which was marked by the adoption of the European calendar-making 
technique, a wide range of new crops from Europe (such as the potato) and the New 
World (sweet potatoes, maize, chilli, cotton and groundnuts), it is indeed a period of 
technological 'windfall'. Also, in reality technical inventions and innovations do not 
always directly translate into output and income. It is normal to have time lag between 
inventions and their applications. So, invention rate alone is not the sufficient condition 
for an economy to slow down at the same time and to the same degree. China’s 
economy may not have been 'trapped' as a recent study suggests that China's living 
standards were still high by world standards during the late Qing.100
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  Furthermore, although the efficiency of traditional technology was not continuously 
improvable, it certainly has a very long 'shelf life'. In Europe, trial-and-error based 
'traditional' technology promoted some far-reaching changes including geographical 
discoveries in the fifteenth century and a long line of technical improvements to 
machinery at the hands of artisans including James Watt. In China, according to Buck, 
as much as 25 per cent of agricultural growth during the 1930s was owed to 
streamlining of traditional technology.101 If invention rate and new technology are not 
the sufficient condition for modern growth to take place, China's retardation is likely to 
have been much more than merely a failure to take full advantage of the indigenous 
technology or to adopt European technology. 
  Bray blamed the unique technical feature of rice cultivation which is allegedly able 
to suck in any amount of capital and labour inputs without reaching the point where the 
marginal product of labour equals zero.102 So, rice farming had no negative returns for 
its potential was never to be fully realised. Rice-farming Asia, she argued, had little 
surplus labour and capital available for non-agricultural and non-rural development. 
Her theory indicates that an Asian rice economy will only break away from this trap 
when subject to external shocks. Naturally one would ask why rice-producing Japan 
modernised and why China that never had a mono-crop agriculture did not make it. The 
fact that greater external shocks like the Opium War were befallen on Qing China than 
in Tokugawa Japan helped but little. Wet rice cultivation is thus not the determinant 
factor in development in East Asia. To find a way out, Bray treated Tokugawa Japan as 
a petty commodity producer that could escape from the constraint of rice farming, 
ignoring the fact that China was a far more ancient and active petty commodity 
producer than Japan.103  
  Rent-seeking government and exploitative landlordism hypothesis. A revisionist 
view treats China as a unique case in which owner-farmers and small landlords 
prevailed compared to the large feudal holdings in much of medieval Europe and pre-
Meiji Japan.104 Based in mainland China and orchestrated by Maoism, scholars of this 
school held that small owner-farms could barely maintain subsistence because of the 
combination of their low productivity and heavy tax burdens. Most tenants on larger 
estates also lived at subsistence level for they were ruthlessly exploited by landlords for 
rent. Because the government had only non-productive fiscal policies while landlords 
were merely interested in re-investing in land and maintaining an extravagant life-style, 
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the economy as a whole was locked in stagnant agriculture with a lack of economies of 
scale, weakness in the social division of labour and a deficiency in the formation of 
both the capitalists and the proletariat – all harmful to capitalist industrialisation. The 
school thus claimed that China's indigenous capitalist growth potential was retarded by 
China's income distribution system.105 Often Western imperialism was added as another 
key retardant for native modern growth. 
  Some scholars attributed China's stagnation to the small scale in family-cum–
farming. Bray viewed underdevelopment of capitalism in Chinese agriculture as a result 
of the overwhelmingly small landholding pattern in the entire post-Han history (220–
1911).106 Huang's study suggests that since around AD 1000 the 'familisation' of rural 
production in the Yangzi Delta, China's most advanced farming zone, led to economic 
'involution'.107 But in terms of small holding, China was not alone. Land reforms in 
Russia (1906–11), Japan (1873) and South Korea (1947–8) all aimed to create small 
landholding farms as a necessary step towards capitalist industrialisation.108 Large-scale 
farming is thus not necessary to help industrialisation, a phenomenon which is called 
'diseconomies of scale' in farming. Why then should such a landholding pattern be a 
problem for Chinese economic development? 
  Regarding exploitation, supposing that all the agricultural surplus were taken away 
from the producers in the forms of rent and tax, the ordinary farmer would have little 
left to support a bigger family. Population growth would thus have to be modest simply 
because of the prevailing poverty among the vast majority in society. Indeed, the 
Tokugawa feudal system put the Japanese population under such a check, as 
convincingly argued by Feeney and Hamano.109 On the other hand, if population 
increase is a sign of a retained agricultural surplus among the masses, the notion of the 
excessive rent-seeking landlord class/state collapses. 
  Despite the fact that the rise in landlordism is often represented as its central 
feature, the period between mid-eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth 
century witnessed China's population to triple at an annual rate of 1.45 percent.110 One 
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possible explanation could be that the Chinese landlords and bureaucrats generated the 
population growth due to their good life. If so, the annual growth by these two strata 
would have to be impossibly high: 2.5–4.8 per cent (if landlords and bureaucrats with 
their families were 40 per cent of the total population) or 3.3–6.3 per cent (if they 
represented 30 per cent), both being too high a proportion in the population according 
to most works, or 5–19 per cent (if they constituted 10 to 20 per cent, which are the 
more likely proportions).111 These rates are beyond the human biological capacity for 
reproduction. So, a rapid demographic growth must be a result of a better material life 
among the general public. 
  To elaborate this point further, it is often mentioned that during the Ming–Qing 
Period the tenancy rate was higher in South than in North China.112 Landlord 
determinism expects to see less population growth in the south than in the north. But 
evidence shows just the opposite. South China had a higher population growth than 
North China which means the landlord class was unable to siphon off the agricultural 
surplus. In the north where the tenancy rate was low, population growth was also strong 
which suggests that the government was inefficient in tapping away the surplus, too.113 
Here, population growth itself provides an acid test of the rent-seeking government and 
exploitative landlord hypothesis. In reality, the rent-seeking tendency of the Chinese 
state was checked by society and the bureaucracy was rather professional by most 
standards.114 After all, the state only controlled a low percentage of GDP.115
  Moreover, if excessive rent-seeking by the landlord class and the government had 
taken place, the Marxian concept of 'primitive capital accumulation' and the formation 
of a 'proletariat' should have been present, and China should have headed for 
capitalism. That was not the case. 
  Role of the state. The role of the state was given strong emphasis by Gerschenkron, 
North and Thomas in explaining growth in the West.116 The same 'visible hand' 
approach appears in analysis of Asian tigers' miracle growth experience in recent 
writings by Alam, Amsden, Wade et al.117 With the benefit of hindsight, the 
contemporary concept of 'predatory' and 'developmental' states has been used to 
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examine China both implicitly and explicitly. Bureaucratic efficiency and rent-seeking 
behaviour are neatly embodied in many depictions of the Chinese state including 
'Oriental despotism' (referring to the state apparatus),118 'conservatism' (applied to the 
entire elite),119 and 'all encompassing' power of the state (combining both the apparatus 
and elite).120 At its centre, Fairbank's 'dynastic cycle' has a highly-efficient predatory 
state. Mokyr's recent view that Chinese technology depended on the state is another 
conjecture.121 The Marxian AMP, which portrays the Oriental state as the sole 
economic decision-maker, falls into the same category.122 In any case, the state is held 
responsible for China's retardation. The underlying assumption of these works is that 
the Chinese state was highly efficient in expropriating resources from the economy, 
distorting the market mechanisms, jamming business links and hindering further 
growth. For example, Fairbank maintained that as a well-organised institution the 
Imperial bureaucracy possessed enormous coercive power to control the merchant class 
and to obstruct any undesirable or 'nonorthodox' growth in the economy. Moreover, as 
an attractive profession, state service siphoned off a continuous supply of the best 
educated and most talented citizens.123
  Some evidence can certainly be found to support claims that the Chinese state was 
both efficient and rent-seeking. China has remained one of the largest political units 
since Christ. From the thirteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, hundreds of 
thousands of tons of tax grain were shipped each year from South China to feed the 
northerners. This formed the most lasting, long distance, non-market-driven shipment 
of goods in world history. The Great Walls, the most expensive defence system in the 
premodern world, were initiated and supported by the state with huge material and 
labour inputs. Most dramatically, there were cases of the sudden abandonment of the 
multiple voyages by the Ming Imperial navy to Southeast and South Asia, the Middle 
East and probably East Africa and the sweeping imposition of maritime bans along the 
empire's coast-lines.124  
  However, for extreme versions of the predatory state, there is also plenty of 
evidence to suggest that the Chinese state was benign and weak. Or, it appeared benign 
because it was a very inefficient predator for rent. How can we explain the widespread 
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market activities (regional, inter-regional and overseas) over the long run?125 By 
definition, commercialisation on that scale can hardly be 'engineered' and 'controlled' by 
a single centre of power even with modern information technology. Given the scope of 
commercial activity, one must assume either that the anti-market policies of the state 
were cancelled out by the market, or that the state was persuaded to be friendly to 
markets. A lack of control explains why in traditional China urban centres, science and 
technology flourished.126 These achievements in turn dispute the judgement that an 
institutional barrier was not any more prohibitive in bureaucratic China than in Europe 
where an authoritarian bureaucracy was supposedly absent. After all, the first-recorded 
large-scale intensive growth (growth in per capita terms) occurred in Song China, not in 
Europe nor Japan.127  
  Also, for argument's sake, if the postulation of a super-efficient Chinese 
bureaucracy were accepted, historians would still ask what was the incentive for the 
Chinese state to distort the market, interfere with business and hinder growth and why 
did the Chinese state persist in 'misusing' its power over the centuries, given the degree 
of economic sophistication that China managed to reach, such a policy could only have 
entailed enormous opportunity costs for the economy as a whole as well as for the 
government revenue and popularity? 
  Turning to the drain of talent, evidence shows that openings in the bureaucracy 
were entirely limited.128 In the Northern Song Dynasty, the national average candidate-
success ratio was 10.2:1; while the estimated ratio for the Qing Dynasty was even 
poorer, varying between 30:1 and 100:1.129 The long-term pass rate in the examinations 
is estimated as less than 10 per cent of all candidates.130 Only a minority of the 
educated became officials. The majority of the Chinese literati had to, and did, make a 
living outside officialdom which inevitably benefited rather than harmed the economy 
with quality human capital.131  
  Or, perhaps China's failure was rooted in its centralised state structure which 
overruled internal competition while inter-state competition in Europe worked in 
comparable ways to market competition and led Western Europe towards an Industrial 
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Revolution.132 Mokyr's suggestion does not explain why and how this centralised state 
at least tolerated growth in China until the sixteenth century and possibly later? More 
important, China always faced competition from the Steppes and increasingly so after 
AD 1000 considering the Tartars, Mongols and Manchus. So, competition among 
political units does not seem to have been a necessary condition for growth to continue 
after the Song. 
  Many scholars tend to forget that the traditional Chinese state was premodern if not 
primitive. It was either ‘predatory’ nor ‘developmental’. Compared with early modern 
states in Western Europe and Japan, the Chinese state looks weak and inefficient. It is 
therefore dubious to blame the Confucian state for what it was not designed for and 
virtually had no control over.133 In particular, in the Gerschenkronian model the role of 
state is relevant to objectives to generate modern growth. This agenda looks rather 
irrelevant for Chinese bureaucracy of premodern times (whose designed tasks and 
commitments were chiefly to maintain social order and to secure people's other basic 
needs).134 It is a tall order for the premodern Chinese state to behave like a 
Gerschenkronian institution as that kind of state of 'good behaviour' was yet to be 
developed, tested and refined. 
  World-system paradigm. Finally, attempts have also been made to explain China's 
underdevelopment in the macro-context of the world economy. Lenin and Wallerstein 
both indicated the existence of a developmental hierarchy in a super-macro system 
embracing the entire world.135 Within this world-system, economic growth in less 
developed societies is dictated by the advanced countries. Imperialist/colonialist powers 
exploit the underdeveloped countries in the interests of the metropolitan populations. It 
is in the interest of such powers not to see modern economic growth taking place in the 
Third World. It is an appealing thought, the diktat imposed on China by the West, 
Russia and Japan after 1840, exemplifying the point. In terms of timing, the almost 
symmetrical of the downfall of China vis-à-vis the rise of the West and Japan since the 
Opium War in 1840 implies some kind of world-wide causality may have been at work. 
But given that China and Western Europe reached more or less the same technical and 
economic levels around the seventeenth century,136 world-system determinism does not 
                                                 
132 Mokyr, The Lever of Riches, ch. 9. 
133 Feuerwerker, 'The State and the Economy', pp. 321-4; Jones, Growth Recurring, ch. 8. Any forced analogy 
between the Soviet command economy under Stalin’s totalitarianism and the function of the premodern Chinese 
state is without illumination. 
134 Wong, China Transformed, pt. 2. 
135 Lenin, 'Imperialism'; Mao, Selected Works; see also Wallerstein,World-System. 
136 Hartwell, Iron and Early Industrialism; Hartwell, 'A Cycle of Economic Change'; Elvin, The Pattern; 
Elvin, 'China as a Counterfactual'; Bray, 'Agriculture'. 23 
tell us how and why followers eventually became leaders and vice versa, as if the world 
order is given both ab extra and a priori. 
  Goldstone suggested from another angle that there existed a macro system across 
Eurasia during the early modern period. Key societies (namely England, France, 
Germany, the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan) synchronised in at least two areas – 
population pressure and resource constraints (as seen in food prices, elite employment 
opportunities and government budgets). Crises and 'revolutions' were the universal 
result.137 If this is true, why did revolutions in seventeenth century England, eighteenth 
century France and, to a certain extent, nineteenth century Japan, usher in a new era of 
industrial growth, but proved unhelpful to their Ottoman and Chinese counterparts? Or, 
why did a further developmental synchronisation have to fail, which left mainland Asia 
to poverty but led Western Europe to abundance? 
  No doubt, it is always easier to blame external factors for internal problems. World-
systems analysis serves such purposes. The world-system paradigm has been the 
official line in mainland China and appeared in most textbooks there. We only have to 
ask why economies like Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia, which had deals 
from the same world-system just as raw as China, have so far developed so much 
further than China? 
 
V 
The sheer number of possible hypotheses reviewed here shows just how many variables 
need to be taken into account in dealing with the Chinese experience of the past 
millennia. This survey also indicates just how far apart scholars are in solving the 
paradox in Chinese past. These hypotheses are valid in explaining the development in 
many parts of the world or for some parts of the Chinese past. But when dealing with 
long-term premodern Chinese history as a whole, they become in one way or another 
inadequate. A synthesis is far from being easy. The real challenge comes form how to 
embrace numerous variables, none constant, in a framework to explain how rational 
choices led a sophisticated economy to a developmental dead end. With such pluses and 
minuses, caveat emptor.  
  There are two common problems. First, although all these models have offered 
sensible hypotheses of why China declined, they cannot satisfactorily explain why 
China rose in the first place, or vice versa. The cause of this problem is the seeming 
inconsistency or incompatibility between China's achievement and decline, which 
forms the very core of China's paradox. Second, in the use of Europe as a universal 
benchmark the contributory factors to European growth are often taken as the basic. If a 
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society enjoyed these conditions/factors, growth is expected to have taken place. If not, 
something must have gone wrong. In searching for an answer, anything which made 
China distinct from the West is inevitably considered to have been responsible for 
China's downfall. One tends to fall into the trap of afore-mentioned counterfactualism. 
  To avoid these common pitfalls, my own framework to explain Chinese economic 
history over the long term is that there existed a convergent and self-regulating 'trinary 
structure' of agricultural dominance, the landholding peasantry, and physiocratic 
government. This structure created an overall equilibrium and allowed long-term 
growth of a particular type. In this system, the peasantry, not the state, played a central 
role in determining China's path.138
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VI 
Economic history seeks to understand the nature and pattern of economic change over 
time. Chinese experience over the last millenia reached premodern peaks such as the 
sheer size of territory, extents of the market, number of people, the magnitude of 
output, range of technological inventions , degrees of environmental manipulation, 
types of institutions, varieties of policies/regulations, scopes of international influence 
and so forth. China thus forces economic historians to treat the country as seminal. 
Also, with rich materials to work on, China embraces in its past almost all the key 
issues for economic history. China's importance and utility in world economic history 
will remain and research in Chinese economic history will attract even greater attention 
from the scholarly world in this new millennium. Among a great many topics, the 
function of the Chinese state including the standardisation of time, language, roads, 
currency, weights and measures as well as construction and maintenance of the Great 
Walls and Grand Canals may well have been the state response to the demand for 
public goods from the general public to lower transaction costs in the economy rather 
than means to strengthen Imperial rule.139 Although regional, sectoral and short-term 
studies will continue to play their roles in the study of Chinese economic history, there 
will be a good chance for general, cross-regional/sectoral and long-term studies to rise 
because of the comparative advantage of the latter to reflect scale, scope, duration and 
aggregates. New analytical tools will be in use to facilitate wider research into China's 
long-term experience.140 Methodologically, a positive approach will be more 
consciously preferred to a normative approach. In particular, actual development in the 
economy will overrule what the Imperial Court said about the economy. For example, 
the effectiveness of government control cannot be fully assessed unless one goes 
beyond the government sector and even beyond the Chinese territory.141 Last but not 
least, study in the transformation of the Chinese socio-economic system will tell us 
more about the nature of the Chinese system in the past. Such a task will rely heavily on 
horizontal comparisons between mainland China and other 'Chinas' – Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and millions of 'overseas Chinese'.142 Systematic comparisons in 
ideologies, family structures, inheritance patterns, market responsiveness and 
incentives, policy sensitivities, economic propensities and so forth will help identify the 
critical conditions for China to change or not to change. 
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